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Abstract: The paper supports the following thesis: the October Revolution influenced the 
constituency of the Polish independent state in 1918 as well as the structure of class struggles 
in Poland. The history of this impact is absolutely ignored or even denied in contemporary 
Polish anti-communist ruling historical discourse. The centenary of the Russian Revolution 
triggered debates presenting this event as “a demonic source of the 20th century 
totalitarianism”, without mentioning the enthusiasm the Revolution provoked in Polish people 
(who were both actively participating in it and inspired by it). The nationalist historical policy, 
which idealizes Poles at any cost, attempts to erase Polish engagement in “Red October” or 
belittle it as an insignificant episode. For this reason, by analyzing the dominant narrative about 
the Bolshevik Revolution in Poland via the example of Mateusz Staroń’s book Traitors: Poles the 
allies of Lenin, I will show how anti-communist discourse reshapes the past to serve its own 
ideological purposes and present an alternative narrative about the Russian Revolution in 
a Polish context, against these dominant anti-communist clichés, concerning 3 issues:  
1. Polish participation in the October Revolution,  
2. The Revolution’s influence on Poland’s independence,  
3. The Polish workers’ council movement as a direct response to the Russian Revolution. 
In the context of the above, the aim of this paper is not limited to providing an alternative to 
the ruling discourse, being just another exercise in political and historical imagination, or 
attempting to bring to light repressed aspects of Polish history. Rather, it is to show the logic 
and structure of the anti-communist narrative as such. 
 
Keywords: Russian Revolution, Polish independence, anti-communism, historical discourse, 
rightist ideology, worker’s councils 
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The October Revolution influenced both the constitution of the Polish independent state in 
1918 and the structure of class struggles in Poland. However, the history of this impact is 
absolutely ignored or even denied in contemporary Polish hegemonic historical discourse. The 
centenary of the Russian Revolution triggered debates – in national television and mainstream 
newspapers – presenting this event as “the demonic source of twentieth-century 
totalitarianism”, or as “a terrible crime without punishment”. Virtually no one mentioned the 
enthusiasm which the 1917 Revolution generated in Polish people (who actively participated 
in it and were inspired by it). Partisans of nationalist historical policy made massive efforts to 
erase any narration about Polish engagement in “Red October”, or at least to belittle its 
significance.  
In this article, I discuss Polish anti-communist discourse about the Bolshevik Revolution 
in contemporary Poland via the example of Mateusz Staroń’s book Traitors: Poles the allies of 
Lenin1. The rightist journalist argues that Bolsheviks of Polish descent who actively participated 
in struggles during the October days, and thereafter in the building of the Soviet state, were 
traitors of the nation. As Staroń states, “The bond of Polish communists with their native country 
was paranoid – regardless of their motives, acts and words, many of them remained national 
traitors” (Staroń 2018, 14).  
Such a plea is of crucial importance in the frameworks of this discourse. Following this 
logic, these Poles committed a double crime: firstly, they contributed to the establishment of 
the “most genocidal communist system”; secondly, they betrayed their nation, acting de facto to 
the benefit of the foreign country. They were treated as Soviet agents, who placed their 
imagined class identity above their allegedly natural national identity. Actually, apologists of 
anti-communist discourse accuse Polish revolutionaries not only of their presumed or real 
crimes, but also of their perverse decision to deny their Polishness.  
It is important to recognize how the concept of national identity is perceived in this 
context. Belonging to a nation becomes naturalized; people inherit a genetic nationality that 
predisposes them to act in a specific way, i.e. to realize traditional patriotic values through 
placing nation as the highest value (worth dying for its cause). In that light, a decision, made 
by Polish communists, to replace their national identity with a class one meant moral 
corruption, or an evil act against nature itself. Submitting to the communist ideal, they betrayed 
not only their nation, but also most of all themselves. How could Polish-speaking 
representatives of the patriotic intelligentsia become communists? According to Staroń and 
other rightist historians, it is the biggest, almost metaphysical mystery, something lying beyond 
                                               
1 Staroń’s book is the only popular publication (printed in Bellona publishing house – known for the 
popularization of  history) about Polish engagement in Soviet Russia published on the centenary of  the October 
events. The author also runs famous historical blog (http://blog.surgepolonia.pl/) and patriotic clothes company 
Surge Polonia.  
Praktyka Teoretyczna 1(31)/2019 – Anti-communisms: Discourses of Exclusion 
 
52 
any logical explanation, a pure aberration of mind, a kind of sacrifizio dell’intelletto to the fake 
god. As Staroń claimed: “Indeed, it is beyond simple logical explanation why these prominent 
and intelligent persons chose communism as their way of life. (…) We could only suspect what 
in fact were their motives. Unfortunately, they took their secrets to the grave” (Staroń 2018, 
291, 293–294). Therefore, Staroń’s position resembles the famous anti-communist idea by 
Francois Furet: for him communist ideology is a dangerous mental illness, an intellectual virus, 
which inflicted the most prominent minds of the twentieth-century intelligentsia (Furet 1999, 
vii–xii). 
This narrative goes even further and suggests that Polish communists paid the highest 
price for loyalty to Bolshevism – as we know most of them died in Stalinist purges. For this 
nationalistic historiosophy, this tragic end of their communist engagement was a fair 
punishment for the sin against nature, for their betrayal of the nation. The fact that Poles did 
such horrible things as turning against their own national roots was so shameful that their 
history deserved to be totally forgotten, or at best to serve as a warning for the next generations.  
These anti-communist contentions exert a strong influence upon the ongoing processes 
of delegitimization of communism in contemporary Poland, because the very idea of 
internationalism – so the very core of communist identity – is reduced to a mental disease 
resulting in hate, hypocrisy, lies and mass murders (see Staroń 2018, 15)2. The history of Polish 
Bolsheviks within this frame functions as an argument for the causal relation between concept 
(utopian internationalism) and its necessary practical outcome (totalitarian nightmare). This 
perspective is based on the so-called “totalitarian model” of interpretation of Soviet history, 
which is dominant in Polish historiography (Malia 1994, 8–12). The main Polish authors with 
international renown who represent the totalitarian school are Leszek Kołakowski and Andrzej 
Walicki, recognized in Poland as the key experts in this field; even the originator of this model 
was a Pole, Zbigniew Brzeziński, who for the first time used this term in the mid-1950s (see 
Suny 2017, 74). For Domenico Losurdo this totalitarian approach is an example of influential 
historical revisionism3, which aims at the erasure of the revolutionary tradition as such; its most 
                                               
2 Staroń’s main source about the real views and activities of  Polish communists was Jan Alfred Reguła’s (Józef  
Mützenmacher) book “History of  CPP in the light of  facts and documents”. The author was a former member of  the 
party, who in the mid-1930s became a Polish police informer (he was probably also a Gestapo agent during the Nazi 
occupation of  Poland). It is hard to imagine a more biased historical source than police denunciation; that should give 
us a hint about Staroń’s methodological reliability. Besides Reguła’s publication, Staroń most often recalls studies 
written by contemporary Polish anti-communist historians like Miodowski (2017) and Zieliński (2013), whereas from 
international historiography he refers to the so-called conspiracy interpretation of  Bolsheviks funded by western 
capitalists (see McMeekin 2009).  
3 However, it is important to distinguish between the revisionist tradition within western Sovietology 
(represented by leftist and Marxist historians such as Isaac Deutscher or Moshe Lewin, who revised the dominant 
‘totalitarian model’) form Losurdo’s notion of  revisionist historiography. The latter, similarly to Eduard Bernstein’s 
original ‘revisionism’, attempts to expunge the Jacobin-Blanquist legacy, which in the twentieth century 
manifested itself  in Bolshevik practice (Losurdo 2015, 5).  
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eminent representatives were, among others, Ernst Nolte, Francois Furet and Richard Pippes: 
“The main theme of this comprehensive reinterpretation of the contemporary world thus 
becomes even clearer: it involves the liquidation of the revolutionary tradition from 1789 to 
the present” (Losurdo 2015, 5).  
According to this mode of interpretation the Bolshevik revolution was just a political coup 
d’état without any democratic legitimization, without the people’s support – the ultimate aim of 
Bolsheviks was to seize the power and retain it at all costs4. Hence, for totalitarian 
Sovietologists, there was a direct continuity between Lenin and Stalin: the latter stemmed from 
the former and the seeds of the Stalinists’ horror were sown from the very first days of October 
1917. From the philosophical viewpoint, this perspective is profoundly idealistic, that is to say it 
neglects certain social conditions and focuses only on abstract and hypnotic ideas (the 
revolutionary utopia) which political fanatics want to impose on people:  
The concrete agenda of this book [Maila’s Soviet Tragedy – BW], therefore, is to reassert 
the primacy of ideology and politics over social and economic forces in understanding 
the Soviet phenomenon. It is rehabilitating history “from above” at the expense of 
history “from below” as the motive force of Soviet development. Finally, it is to 
resurrect the totalitarian perspective (…); for it was the all-encompassing pretentions of 
the Soviet utopia that furnished what can only be called “the genetic code” of the 
tragedy. (Malia 1994, 16).  
Utopianism in this idealistic and totalitarian perspective5 is understood in a traditional 
conservative manner. At least from Edmund Burke’s critique of the French Revolution, 
utopian ideas are perceived as dangerous illusions. Even if they are grounded on noble and 
humanistic premises (justice and equality), their realization leads directly to monstrous 
consequences – terror and genocide – because human nature is ultimately evil and irreparable. 
                                               
4 Losurdo argues that the thesis of  the Bolshevik coup d’état functions as a main argument for the total 
delegitimization of  communist revolution: “The starting point of  the catastrophe of  the twentieth century is 
Bolshevism, an extension and paroxysmal intensification of  Jacobinism. It might be said that ideological 
intoxication is present in the pure state, this time, since October 1917 was not even a revolution, but a mere coup 
d’état – one that felled not the ancient regime or its residues, but democracy” (Losurdo 2015, 76). For Losurdo’s 
brilliant polemics with self-contradicted coup d’état thesis see: Losurdo 2015, 76–81.  
5 The most comprehensive philosophical theory of  totalitarianism is provided by Hannah Arendt. She 
recognized the very source of  totalitarian monstrous aberrations in the very ideology that stands behind the 
Stalinist as well as the Nazi system. Ideology is understood there as a kind of  logical blanket that individuals 
impose on their thoughts – simplistic and aspiring to a totality world-view, an abstract and messianic idea, whose 
actualization necessarily leads to the outburst of  terror. Slavoj Žižek deconstructs this totalitarian concept of  
ideology, exposing its inability to analyze the complex dialectic of  Stalinism. The internal dynamics of  the Stalinist 
semiotic universe could be demonstrated by the phenomena of  “ultra-orthodoxy” (overidentification with the 
core of  the official ideology): the official façade (communist phraseology) is not a mere illusion hiding the brutal 
reality of  terror (Gulag). Because the ideological façade and terror as its supplement hinge together, both 
moments are necessary for the existence of  the Stalinist system. (Žižek 2004, 196, 262). 
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For this reason, the very concept of “utopia” became for Sovietologist revisionists synonymous 
with Stalinist social engineering, radical transformation of the world, not counting the human 
and social costs of the process. In other words, communist utopia was a sinful attempt to create 
heaven on earth, as Kołakowski and Walicki like to emphasize (Kołakowski 1978; Walicki 
1995). In consequence, people for “totalitarians” are rather passive instruments than active 
agents in the events, because the only revolutionary subject is a party elite full of utopian 
schemes. No wonder this historical approach provides the theoretical matrix for the anti-
communist narratives about the USSR. Staroń and other Polish rightist historians interpret the 
Soviet experiment as a totalitarian embodiment of unrealistic and delusive ideas (like 
international solidarity of the oppressed, common property, or equality of the people). And the 
only acceptable idea, for them, is the idea of nation. References to “totalitarianism” function 
today as, to quote Slavoj Žižek’s felicitous claim, denkenverbot (the prohibition of thinking) – 
“the moment one shows the slightest inclination to engage in political projects that aim 
seriously to challenge the existing order, the answer is immediately: ‘Benevolent as it is, this will 
necessarily end in a new Gulag!’” (Žižek 2002, 3–4). So, at stake here in confrontation with 
anti-communist historiography is not only the narrative about the past, but most of all the 
prospect of the future.  
On the contrary to these revisionist contentions, my aim is to propose an alternative, 
materialist and revisionist interpretation of the Russian Revolution within the Polish context. 
To challenge prevailing anti-communist clichés, I discuss below three areas: 
1. Despite the allegations of the rightist propaganda, many Poles actively participated in the 
1917 revolution, among both field and rank militants, as well as Bolshevik elites; 
2. The revolution had a profound and beneficial influence on the dramatic Polish political 
situation at that time, contributing to resolving the burning issue of independence.  
3. “Red October” empowered Polish proletarians to engage in class struggle and inspired 
them to organize their workers’ councils (Polish Soviets) from the bottom up.  
 
1. Polish Red October  
Imperial Russia in 1917 was a multinational state with one hundred and eighty million 
inhabitants, including approximately four million ethnic Poles (i.e. those who identified 
themselves with the Polish nation and used the Polish language – because Poland as a country 
did not exist at the time). Most of them were civilians, but there were also six hundred thousand 
Poles – mostly peasants – in tsarist uniforms (Toporowicz 1988). In the aftermath of 
subsequent Russian defeats on the Eastern Front, they were becoming more and more radical 
and willing to rebel. These soldiers, together with workers from factories in Petrograd and 
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Moscow6 (which were moved from Congress Poland during wartime), were the main Polish 
force in the Russian Revolutions: both February and October. Poles (including Polish Jews) 
were – besides Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians – one of the most active national groups 
engaged in these events, especially in the Bolshevik uprising. The Party program of distribution 
of land to poor peasants and immediate peace were attractive for former serfs and soldiers 
exhausted by war disaster. The exact number of Poles participating in the October Revolution, 
however, is the subject of ongoing controversy among historians. The Marxist researcher 
suggests that it was at least one hundred thousand people, and two hundred thousand more 
joined the Reds during the civil war against the Whites (Toporowicz 1988, 8). On the other 
hand, right-wing authors, like Staroń, try to underestimate the size of Polish involvement in 
the revolution as about eight thousand participants (Staroń 2018, 79), doing so, nevertheless, 
without any convincing sources. The exact number is almost impossible to verify, but within 
these numbers one can detect the ideological and methodological differences between both 
perspectives. Staroń does not count the popular support for the revolution, i.e. the engagement 
of common folk – peasants and workers – who were not members of any political organization, 
because, like the rest of rightist Sovietologists, he considers the party activists as the only active 
subject of the events. Ideas and great personalities are what matters in history for totalitarian 
anti-communists, not the masses and their grassroots activities. The main difference between 
left and right-wing historians could be reduced to this simple question: who is the subjective 
agent of history, the people or individuals?  
If the scale of the Polish masses’ approval of the Bolsheviks is still ambiguous, the 
support of Polish professional revolutionaries for socialist transformation in Russia is 
unquestionable. The two main Polish radical leftist political parties in Russia, the Polish 
Socialist Party – Left (the internationalist, Marxist faction of the Polish Socialist Party7) and the 
                                               
6 For example, in Putilov Mill in Petrograd, which was famous for the revolutionary activities of  its workers, there 
were several hundred Polish proletarians (Toporowicz 1988, 22). For a complete list of  factories transferred from the 
Kingdom of  Poland to Russia see: Najdus 1967, 8–24. 
7 The crucial difference between the right and left factions of  the Polish Socialist Party was related to the dilemma 
“revolution or independence”: the leftist internationalists did not accept the demand to build an independent state, 
unlike the rightist patriots, who acknowledged an independent Polish state as a necessary precondition for the socialist 
transformation. There were also internal divisions in the two parties that merged in the Communist Party, to quote 
Isaac Deutscher’s observation: “Each of  these two parties had its own traditions. The Social-Democratic Party grew 
in opposition to the nationalism and patriotism of  the Polish nobility, harking back to the insurrectionist romanticism 
of  the nineteenth century, and placed its main emphasis on proletarian internationalism. The Left Socialist Party had 
at first adhered to the patriotic-insurgent tradition, and the restoration of  Poland’s independence had occupied a central 
place in its programme, but later on it came closer to the internationalist attitude of  the Luxemburgist party. The Left 
Socialist Party had its affinities with the Left Mensheviks; only under the influence of  the October Revolution did it 
move closer to Bolshevism. The Social-Democratic Party adopted – as the proceedings of  its Sixth Congress show – 
an attitude very close to that of  Trotsky, remaining independent of  both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. At the 
time of  the revolution, the Luxemburgist party – again like Trotsky – identified itself  with Bolshevism. Here we must 
take note of  the differences within the party between adherents of  the party’s official leaders (Rosa Luxemburg, 
Marchlewski, Jogiches) and the so-called “Splitters” (Dzierżyński, Radek, Unszlicht). This was, however, a discord, not 
a genuine split. The “splitters” represented a certain opposition to the centralism of  the Executive Committee, which 
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Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (the former party of Rosa 
Luxemburg, which represented her hard-line Marxist internationalism), fully supported the 
October Revolution and their members actively participated in it. For example, they formed 
the 1st Polish Revolutionary Regiment and in the summer of 1918 had begun the organization 
of the largest Polish revolutionary formation – the Western Rifle Division, embryo of the 
Polish Red Army8.The Polish regiment was not only formed by Polish militants, because it has 
an internationalist character – Russians, Ukrainians, Koreans, Chinese, Latvians and Germans 
fought hand in hand with Poles in the division (see Wrzosek 1969; Miodowski 2011, 235). 
Staroń’s prejudice against the idea of internationalism as a kind of aberration leads him to the 
bizarre thesis that Russians were so suspicious of Poles that they did not allow them to form a 
fully Polish division (Staroń 2018, 203; Miodowski 2011, 241–242). For him, internationalism 
only concealed Russians’ hatred of the Poles, their Anti-Polonism. The hypothesis of Russian 
communist distrust towards Polish activists because of their inherent – even if repressed – 
patriotism plays an important role in the rightist narrative. We can see how Polish anti-
communism is organically combined with Russophobia.  
In 1917, the SDKPiL even gained official access to the Bolshevik Party. During the next 
year at least four thousand Polish communists got the Bolshevik party card (Toporowicz 1988, 
61). The direct influence of socialist revolution from 1917 on the Polish radical left was the 
unification of those two parties into one Communist Workers’ Party of Poland on 16 
December 1918. It was the very first communist organization in the newly reborn Polish state, 
and its agenda focused on two main issues: supporting the Bolsheviks in the hopes of 
instigating workers’ upheaval in Poland and, for the same cause, supporting the proletarian 
revolution in Germany. What is interesting is that the centrist, social democratic and patriotic 
Polish Socialist Party (the former party of Józef Pilsudski, also known as the Old Faction or 
Revolutionary Faction) initially showed moderate enthusiasm about the October Revolution 
(some of its members even fought in the Red Guard in those days; Najdus 1971, 94–95) 
because their activists presumed that the Bolsheviks could support Polish independence, 
according to their agenda on national self-determination (Toporowicz 1988, 62).  
                                               
operated from abroad. Furthermore, they were somewhat closer to the Bolsheviks. In the Polish Communist Party, the 
SDKPiL tradition was predominant from the beginning. Nevertheless, the importance of  these differences should not 
be exaggerated. They were in actual fact restrained and even obliterated by the real unity of  the newly-founded party 
and the conviction of  its members that the old divisions were a matter of  the past. The party’s ranks were further 
united by a sharp awareness of  their common and unyielding opposition to the nationalist and reformist Poland, to 
the Poland of  the landlords and petty nobility” (Deutscher 1958).  
8 However, the very idea of  a Polish Red Army and ethnicity-based military revolutionary formations in general 
provoked controversy among Polish communists. For example, the “luxemburgists” – very influential in the milieu of  
Polish communists in Soviet Russia - were skeptical about organizing national regiments that only preserved the 
reactionary ethnic differences within the proletariat. Due to their opposition, as well as other factors, the project of  
establishment of  Polish formations ultimately failed (Miodowski 2011, 213–230).  
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The most influential Polish Bolsheviks9 from the revolutionary period were:  
 
● Karl Radek10, the charismatic agitator and publicist, polyglot and one of the main 
Bolshevik theoreticians from that period, who in 1917 became Vice-Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs (Trotsky’s deputy);  
● Feliks Kon, the old Polish socialist who was fighting in Kharkov during the upheaval, 
and became a member of the CC of The Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine;  
● Stanisław Pestkowski, member of the CC of the Bolshevik Party in 1917, Stalin’s deputy 
commissar (in the People’s Commissar for Nationality Affairs) and temporary central 
bank governor;  
● Józef Unszlicht, member of the Petrograd Military-Revolutionary Council, one of the 
organizers of the Red Army and Soviet power in Belorussia. 
 
Unszlicht was a founding father of the Soviet secret police (Cheka and then GPU), along with 
two other famous ethnic Poles in revolutionary Russia, namely Felix Dzierżyński (director of 
Cheka) and Wiaczesław Mienżyński (its first deputy)11. Mienżyński, one of the most mysterious 
members of the Soviet nomenklatura, spoke twelve languages, played the piano well, and was 
called “my decadent neurotic” by Lenin. 
Dzierżyński, “The Iron Felix”, was born in 1877 near Minsk in the borderlands of 
Lithuania-Belorussia in a family of landowners of the Polish nobility. After losing his parents, 
he began studies for the Catholic priesthood. In the Wilno gymnasium, he converted to 
Marxism and was expelled two months before graduation. Thus he developed into a socialist 
agitator in SDKPiL and became one of its founders. Yet he ended up spending eleven years in 
tsarist prisons, in internal exile, and at hard labor in penal colonies, and he became 
consumptive. 
 
                                               
9 There were two most important institutions of  Polish communists in the newly born Soviet state: the Commissary 
for Polish Affairs (one of  sixteen national sections of  Stalin’s Commissary for Nationality Affairs) run by Julian 
Leszczyński-Leński (a member of  the SDKiPL leadership) and the Polish Bureau of  CC RCP(b), the so-called Polbiuro, 
constituted in 1919 with Julian Marchlewski as a chair.  
10 Almost none of  the numerous historical works about Polish involvement in the Russian Revolution and the 
Soviet state in general published after 1945 mention Radek, because he was censored by the official narrative as a 
Trotskyist. The Communist Party of  the USSR exonerated him in 1988.  
11 After the Bolshevik revolution, five Polish communists became members of  the VTsIK: Dzierżyński, Jakow 
Dolecki, Bernard Zaks, Franciszek Grzelszczak and Ignacy Gintowt-Dziewałtowski. However, the CC of  RCP(b) 
included Dzierżyński, Pestkowski and Bronisław Wesołowski (who was for a while chairman of  the Revolutionary 
Tribunal) (for a detailed history of  Polish Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia see: Najdus 1967). The fact that Polish 
communists occupied such important positions in the newly constituted Soviet power provides a strong argument 
against Staroń’s suspicion of  Bolsheviks’ distrust of  Poles. 
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His eyes certainly looked as if they were bathed in tears of eternal sorrow, but his mouth 
smiled an indulgent kindness,” observed the British sculptor Clare Sheridan, who in 
1920 made a bust of him. Dzierżyński had a certain political vulnerability, having joined 
the Bolsheviks only in April 1917 and then opposed Lenin over Brest-Litovsk (1918) 
and workers’ opposition (1921), but he won plaudits as the scourge of 
counterrevolutionaries and for living like a revolutionary ascetic, sleeping in his 
unheated office on an iron bed, subsisting on tea and crusts of bread. He reported to 
Lenin personally and once Lenin became incapacitated, got still closer to Stalin (Kotkin 
2015, 459). 
Although many current authors picture him as a Stalinist avant la lettre and the embodiment of 
communist evil, it is far from the truth. Polish journalist Sylwia Frołow in her well-balanced 
biography of Dzierżyński provides strong arguments against these simplified judgments 
(Frołow 2014), and her book is one of the few examples of non-anti-communist publications 
about Bolsheviks in Poland. It is worth mentioning that Frołow is a liberal journalist and her 
book was printed in the famous anti-communist and Catholic publishing house “Znak”.  
Interestingly, despite Staroń’s anti-communism, he appreciates Dzierżyński’s role in early 
Soviet Russia as the most powerful Bolshevik beside Lenin at that time, especially when citing 
the symptomatic thesis of another rightist publicist: “Only two Poles had a significant impact 
on the Twentieth Century. The first one might have been the priest Felix Dzierżyński and the 
second one was Karol Wojtyła – the future pope” (Staroń 2018, 63). In nationalistic discourse, 
emphasizing Polish ethnicity is an obsession. Even if Dzierżyński was a hardline internationalist 
who did not declare himself as a Pole, in the light of the genetic concept of naturally determined 
national identity his Polish origins were more important than his worldview. Dzierżyński serves 
also as evidence that Poles influenced world history, which expresses an inferiority complex of 
Polish nationalists. For Staroń, one’s political identity (being an internationalist communist or 
a rightist patriot) is secondary to one’s inherited ethnicity, which is at stake here. It means that 
the true antagonism is not between classes but between nations, in this context Russians versus 
Poles.  
This is a perfect example of the ideology of Polonophobia, constitutive for right-wing 
historiography. According to this attitude, Polish spiritual and material integrity is in permanent 
danger because of foreign hostility – Russians, Germans, and Jews (the main nations accused 
of racial prejudice against Poles) are recognized as an extreme threat for Poland. Within the 
paranoid structure of this ideology, the Polish nation is the greatest victim in world history, 
surrounded by enemies, who want to discriminate against, suppress, or even exterminate Poles. 
So the anti-Semitism or Russophobia of Polish nationalists is reflected – in a purely ideological 
way – in their concept of the anti-Polonism of Jews or Russians: the antipathy toward the Other 
is justified and rationalized as a protection from the Other’s alleged enmity towards Poles. 
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Following that argument, it indicates that Soviet Russia, from the very beginning, intended to 
destroy Poland as a country as well as Polish national-cultural heritage – using Polish 
communists to realize this aim. On the one hand the rightist nationalist looks for potential 
enemies of the fragile Polish nation, but on the other hand, they praise every historical 
achievement made by “great Poles”.  
This paradoxical logic leads Staroń to the almost perverse statement that the Polish 
traitors – an incarnation of evil and moral decline for the author – were the true heroes of the 
revolution and without their full commitment in the October days the Bolsheviks would even 
have lost their power. For example, when he writes about revolutionary combat in Petrograd 
and Moscow, he notes that Pestkowski and Juliusz Leszczyński organized the successful 
acquisition of Petrograd’s Post Office (Staroń 2018, 69), Stanisław Budzyński and Stanisław 
Bobiński were the true heroes of the Moscow fights, and other Polish Bolsheviks led the assault 
on the Kremlin (Staroń 2018, 72–78). The story goes as follows: the revolution was made by 
Russians, but without Polish support – from Dzierżyński, Pestkowski, et consortes – it would 
have failed12. Between the lines we can read great regret that such disciplined and dedicated 
militias were fighting for world communism, not for the Polish independent bourgeois state.  
2. Bolsheviks and Polish independence  
The influence of the October Revolution on Poland mostly concerns the issue of Poland’s 
independence. In 1913, Lenin had already written in “Theses on the National Question”:  
From this point of view the following circumstance must be given special attention. 
There are two nations in Russia that are more civilized and more isolated by virtue of a 
number of historical and social conditions and that could most easily and most 
“naturally” put into effect their right to secession. They are the peoples of Finland and 
Poland (Lenin 1913).  
Four watchwords had accompanied Red October in 1917: peace, land, and bread, but also 
national self-determination; the latter notion had been part and parcel of the Bolshevik program 
since 1903. It was not an ungrounded declaration, because on 8 November 1917 Lenin 
proposed and signed the famous “Decree on Peace”, which outlined measures for Russia's 
withdrawal from the First World War without “payment of indemnities or annexations”13. This 
                                               
12 To present the whole complexity of  this paranoid nationalist anti-communist logic we should state as 
follows: Russians organize revolution in order to destroy Poland (and other nations), and without Polish 
involvement the revolution would not succeed. From this perspective it became obvious why Staroń called the 
Polish revolutionaries the nation-traitors… 
13 It is worth mentioning that the first document during the Russian Revolution concerning the issue of  Polish 
independence was a Petrograd Soviet proclamation “To the Polish People” from 27 March 1917, in which Poland 
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idea of just and democratic peace was received by all, not only revolutionary, democratic forces 
in Poland – the official announcement of Pilsudski’s PPS about the peace treaty was similar to 
the Bolsheviks’ decree (Jabłoński 1962, 66). It is well known in Poland that the 
internationalization of the issue of Polish independence – i.e. the alliance’s recognition of a 
Polish independent and autonomous state as a condition for the peace in Europe – was a result 
of Woodrow Wilson’s memorable “Fourteen Points” (the 13th concerned Poland) of January 
1918, but hardly anyone admits that his speech was a direct response to Lenin’s decree. Anti-
communist historians try to depreciate this fact because their arguments are based on an 
oversimplified assumption that no one could treat what disingenuous Bolsheviks had said 
seriously14.  
In contrast to their prejudices, the new Russian government did not stop at empty 
promises, and on 16 November promulgated “The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of 
Russia”, which proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia and their right 
to self-determination, including secession and formation of a separate state. Certain historians 
treated this document as one of the main bases for the liberation of Central European states, 
including Poland. It was the fulfilment of Lenin’s statement that “there will be no free Poland 
without free Russia” (Jabłoński 1962, 57). However, it must be noted that Poland was on the 
other side of the Eastern Front – not under Soviet jurisdiction – and, for that reason, the 
Bolsheviks’ policy could affect it only symbolically. But there is no doubt that one of the 
consequences of the October Revolution was the full internationalization of Polish affairs. In 
this case, the Entente countries accepted the idea of the self-determination of the Polish nation 
partially owing to the Soviet standpoint (both Lloyd George and Wilson; Jabłoński 1962, 60–
61). To quote Juliusz Górecki, a Polish right-wing journalist from that time, certainly not a 
Bolshevik supporter: “the Russian revolution was the first to decidedly and unreservedly 
recognize the right of the Polish nation to independence” (Jabłoński 1967, 47).  
Nonetheless, maybe the most important aspect of the 1917 revolution for the future 
Polish state was the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk at the turn of 1917–1918. There was 
great hope at the beginning that the Soviet side would realize the concept of peace without 
annexations – which could guarantee independence for Poland – but the ultimate result of the 
negotiations came as a huge disappointment. The Bolsheviks’ tactic was to drag out the peace 
talks for as long as possible and play for time in the hope that the peace campaign might spark 
a revolution in the West. With the Ukrainians detached from the Russians at the beginning of 
1918, the Germans greatly strengthened their position at the Brest-Litovsk talks (Figes 1996, 
519). Therefore, the Bolsheviks capitulated under the German conditions, which included the 
                                               
received from Russian democratic forces the right to self-determination and full independence (Jabłoński 1962, 43–
44).  
14 Thesis on disingenuous Bolsheviks as a rule, see: Maila 1994, 132.  
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acceptance of the annexation of Polish territory. Nevertheless, there was one decisive aftermath 
of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk for the Polish future – the Soviet government officially 
renounced its right to the Kingdom of Poland and the outcome was the cancellation of treaties 
that legitimized Polish partition on 29 August 1918. For Marxist historians of the Polish journey 
to independence, that event had a crucial impact on the formal and legal status of Polish 
statehood, because Soviet Russia was the first to officially delegitimize the idea of the partition 
of Poland, which somehow opened up the possibility of the existence of a free country. If in 
Brest Russia relinquished its annexation of Poland, then on 29 August it abolished the legal 
legitimacy of the very partition (Jabłoński 1967, 71)15. It should not surprise us that rightist 
historians ignore this fact, because in their narrative Bolsheviks only wanted to impose the 
revolution on Poles from above, so their affirmation of the Polish people’s right to 
independence could not be taken at face value. It means that the propagandist slogan of 
national self-determination was a disguise for the real agenda of Soviet communists – 
reconstructing the old Russian Empire in the new Red clothes, to replace negligent tsarist 
bureaucracy with disciplined and loyal commissars (Zieliński 2013, 22–23). 
How did Polish leftist parties react to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk? As an act of protest 
against this agreement, PPS – both its left and right factions – abandoned the Commissar of 
Polish Affairs, a Soviet institution within Stalin’s Commissar of Nationalities that represented 
the interests of Poles in Russia (Zieliński 2013, 31). The only party that remained in it was 
SDKPiL, but their leadership – Bobiński, Leszczyński and Unszlicht – also strongly 
condemned the treaty, although for another reason than PPS. If the former saw in it the betrayal 
of the Polish right to self-determination, the latter agreed with the “Left Communists’” 
opposition against the peace, led by Nikolai Bukharin and Karl Radek (one of the SDKiPL 
leaders) (Najdus 1971, 70–73). They were sure that Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria 
were all on the verge of revolution, and wanted to continue war with a newly-raised 
revolutionary force while awaiting these upheavals. Ultimately the upheavals did not arrive, and 
after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk there was no real prospect of the revolution spreading to the 
West.  
                                               
15 Another symbolically significant act of  Soviet Russia was an unprecedented decree proclaimed a few months 
after Red October, in which Sovnarkom committed to return to the Polish people all cultural heritage that was looted 
by the tsars. That decree provoked huge enthusiasm among some Polish communists; for instance, Stanisław Bobiński 
said: “When? Where? In what epoch has such a thing happened, that the government of  a much stronger country not 
only returned independence to the weaker nation but also returned to it priceless works of  art, which were appropriated 
during wartime?” (Bobińska 1966, 175).  
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3. Workers’ Councils and revolutionary fervor in Poland  
Although in 1918 the Red Army did not manage to rally revolution in the West, Polish people 
(mostly proletarians) organized from below their own Workers' Councils – representative 
organizations of Polish Soviet workers and peasants. The first council was established in 
October 1918 in Lublin, and after half a year in the former Kingdom of Poland more than one 
hundred of such Soviets had emerged (Malinowski 1967, 85; Jabłoński 1962, 181). Their 
structures and goals were directly inspired by Russian revolutionary councils and similar Soviet 
movements in Germany and Hungary, as an attempt to constitute dual power in the Polish 
territories. Therefore, councils were the platform that represented the interests of working 
people and protected them against oppression from the government. The main organizations 
behind the initiative were the Social Democracy and the Polish Socialist Party – Left, which 
soon – as mentioned above – merged to form the Communist Party of Poland. Other workers’ 
organizations and parties competed for influence within the councils as well, including the 
Polish Socialist Party, the Bund in Poland (an anti-Zionist Jewish socialist movement), and the 
National Workers” Union (a democratic nationalist party, established after the revolution in 
1905 by the right-wing National Democracy in order to increase its support amongst the 
working class). Due to significant disputes over the political and economic future of the newly 
independent Poland, the councils failed to create an executive committee – there were too 
many internal divisions in the weak workers’ movement (especially related to the issue of 
“independence versus socialism”). Even the revolutionary left unified their forces too late, i.e. 
in December 1918, when the bourgeois state apparatus had already been solidified.  
Nevertheless, over one hundred workers’ councils operated in Poland in the years 1918–
191916, assembling around a half million workers, peasants and craftsmen. The most numerous 
and radical councils were located inter alia in Lublin, Warsaw, Zamość and Zagłębie 
Dąbrowskie (Dąbrowa Basin – the most industrial region of the Polish lands, in which 
communists had the greatest support); some of them even set up their own military self-defense 
units, Red Guards, and People’s Militia (with their political commissars exactly as in their 
Russian counterparts)17. Councils with a communist majority – especially the most influential 
one in Dąbrowa – attempted to organize the germ of the workers’ power in Poland, the Polish 
Soviet Republic. Their agenda was to constitute a “proletarian dictatorship” that would 
                                               
16 Apart from the 1918–1919 period, workers’ councils in Poland had also been set up in Congress Poland during 
the Revolution of  1905, in 1944–1947 in the aftermath of  World War II (see: Kenney 1997), and in the Polish People’s 
Republic during the Polish October of  1956 (see: Matejko 1963). Strike committees and councils appeared during the 
“Solidarność” strikes of  1980–1981 as well. 
17 Elections for the Workers’ Councils which sprang up in 1918 revealed that the Communist Party had a level of  
support almost equal to that of  the Polish Socialist Party – communists had a majority in Dąbrowa Council, and 
socialists led the Warsaw and Łódź Councils. The results of  general the elections were as follows: for 2357 delegates, 
there were 869 representing PPS, 810 CWPP, and 251 Bund (Jabłoński 1962, 192).  
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expropriate capitalists and landowners (Jabłoński 1962, 184–185). This aim is connected with 
the episode of the Red Republic of Dąbrowa (Deutscher 1958). In the territories under council 
control they established progressive and pro-worker policies: an 8-hour workday, wage 
increases, and public works for the unemployed (Bicz 1934, 33). At the turn of 1918 and 1919 
those units, council representatives, and trade unionists18 organized the biggest strikes of that 
time, such as a general strike throughout the Dąbrowa coalfields on 8 November 1918 (Bicz 
1934, 22), demonstrations by the unemployed, and demonstrations of solidarity with Soviet 
Russia (for example, a huge demonstration on the first anniversary of the October Revolution 
took place in Warsaw).  
Meanwhile, the events across the eastern border inspired a curious social experiment – 
the ephemeral Republic of Tarnobrzeg in eastern Poland. The idea of the Republic emerged 
from mass demonstrations of peasants, which were happening almost on a daily basis in the 
fall of 1918. Former serfs even established their own farm councils, inspired by the urban 
workers19. Additionally, the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (of which Tarnobrzeg 
was part) incited political unrest. On 6 November, after a demonstration with some thirty 
thousand people, local peasants decided to take advantage of it and seize power. Its main 
organizers were two socialist activists – Tomasz Dąbal (who later became a member of the 
Communist Party) and Eugeniusz Okoń, a progressive Roman Catholic priest. As news of the 
Bolshevik Revolution came to Tarnobrzeg, the people decided to follow Communist ideas. 
They demanded liquidation of the capitalist government, socialization of forests and meadows, 
confiscation of church property and, above all, implementation of land reform, which would 
result in taking away land from rich owners and giving it to the poor peasantry. Also, the 
peasants, directed by Okoń and Dąbal, started to coordinate their local administration (in four 
local counties) as well as to organize a peasants’ militia. Unfortunately, the Republic of 
Tarnobrzeg was pacified by units of the freshly created Polish Army at the beginning of 1919. 
These examples show to what extent the idea of Polish Soviet power was powerful in 
those stormy years. What happened then to the Workers’ Councils? They were dismantled 
around July 1919, following the withdrawal of the Polish Socialist Party (which in many cases 
had a council majority), and suppression by the Polish government, which saw the councils as 
a barrier to the formation of a bourgeois Polish state (Szczygielski and Tymieniecka 1960, 101). 
To understand this process, we should outline the broader context of the genesis of an 
independent Poland. On 7th November 1918 Polish reformist socialists established the 
Provisional Government of the Polish People’s Republic in Lublin with Ignacy Daszyński as a 
                                               
18 This means that the first united socialist and communist federation of  trade unions in Europe was established 
in Poland (Malinowski 1967, 97)  
19 A quite similar republic, but on a smaller scale, was created for six weeks in Pińczów (in central Poland), where 
peasant rebellion was led by Jan Lisowski (SDKPiL activist) and former Austrian officer Kalinka (“Kazuń”).  
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prime minister. On the one hand, its agenda was progressive for that time (land reform, 
nationalization of industry, workers’ control over the enterprises, free and secular education, 
and so on – the typical program of reforming capitalism), but on the other, this policy would 
be proposed only as a bill for the future parliament. The path to socialism was supposed to 
lead through parliamentary democracy. For this reason, Lublin’s cabinet was subordinated to 
Piłsudski on 18 November, and a new government was constituted representing so-called 
national unity, and socialist Jędrzej Moraczewski became its chairman (with the support of the 
democratic alliance of PPS and the leftist peasants’ party).  
The new office was still the “people’s” by name, but in fact, in its actions, it protected 
the interests of the Polish ruling classes and rescued Poland from the possible revolutionary 
scenario. Its reign brought about three major achievements: introducing an 8-hour workday, 
universal suffrage (including for women) and… suppression of the workers’ and peasants’ 
council movement (it disarmed Red Guards, brutally crushed strikes and smashed Tarnobrzeg’s 
uprising). PPS, especially party elites, strongly supported this new government and actively 
helped to dismantle the Workers’ Council – it was time for the long-awaited independent state, 
not for the socialist revolution20. As we know very well from the example of the post-Second-
World-War period in Western Europe, social democracy was a vaccine against the communist 
threat. No wonder that “Our Tribune”, the official organ of SDKPiL, compared Moraczewski’s 
government to Kerensky’s in Russia: “What differentiates Polish kiereńszczyzna from the 
Russian one is the fact that it was not begotten by revolution, but by the fear of reactionaries” 
(Jabłoński 1962, 200). As Jabłoński summarized: 
The statement that all the cabinets then [in 1918-1919 - BW] were about to prevent 
social revolution in Poland is unquestionable, as everybody, from communists to 
conservatives, agreed on it. But why did the social masses not understand this, the 
masses which were far from wishing for the power of the bourgeoisie? (Jabłoński 1962, 
201). 
In trying to answer this question, we should address the internal predicaments of the socialist 
revolution in Poland. The most obvious factor was the weakness of Polish proletarians caused 
by the catastrophic condition of industry after the First World War (production levels had 
                                               
20 Socialists were also divided on this matter – the strongest antagonism was between pro-state party leadership 
and more radical, sometimes even revolutionary, rank and file militants. To give an example of  two radically opposed 
platforms within PPS: the party’s left (led among others by Tadeusz Żarski) wanted to establish ‘dictatorship of  the 
proletariat’ based on the unification of  workers’ councils and repressed all its enemies as counterrevolutionaries 
(Jabłoński 1962, 221–222; Szczygielski and Tymieniecka 1960, 77–78). But the left was the party minority then, and 
the voice of  Mieczysław Niedziałkowski (socialist theoretician) is more representative of  the party’s position: “on 7 th 
November 1918 communism in Poland was mortally wounded” (Niedziałkowski 1930, 12). The author praised PPS 
as the only political force which had a real agenda in countering revolution in Poland in 1918. To examine internal 
disputes between socialists about the workers’ power see: Zaremba 1983, 316–353.  
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decreased about 90 percent compared with 1914) and the insufficient level of revolutionary 
class consciousness among workers (communist propaganda was mostly spreading in Dąbrowa 
coalfield and in some more developed parts of Congress Poland). Beside this objective 
condition, two other issues are of great importance. The Polish poor and working masses were 
disoriented because of the successful socialist agitation21 (PPS promised land reform and 
nationalization of main industries) that convinced them of the advantage of people’s 
government over the council model, and hence the preferability of an independent national 
state over a socialist international republic22. The confusion was due to the fact that, in the eyes 
of the majority of the masses, the counter-revolutionary power was regarded as a revolutionary 
power. We should also not underestimate the fear of possibly repeating the Bolshevik scenario, 
which could result in bloody civil war and foreign interventions. This leads us to the second 
issue: the inability of Polish communists to deploy a convincing alternative narrative. Their 
vision of instigating revolution could be reduced to the hope of immediate intervention by the 
Red Army accompanied by German proletarians on Polish land in order to protect the Soviet 
workers’ dictatorship. That was not enough to win the trust of Polish people who were strongly 
attached to the romantic, patriotic idea of independence. In other words, communists lost the 
battle for hegemony – in the Gramscian sense of the term – over the Polish masses to reformist 
socialists, even if the latter betrayed the real interests of proletarians in favor of bourgeois 
interests. For Marxist historians, socialists were class traitors, just as communists were national 
traitors in the eyes of rightist scholars.  
However, the period of councils had an important impact on the newly established Polish 
state. The anxiety of the socialist revolution forced the first Polish independent government to 
adopt a wide range of social policies (as mentioned before, shortening the workday, securing 
rights to strike, and implementing the whole package of liberal-democratic reforms), which had 
already been initiated by the activity of Workers’ Councils. However, even that was too much 
for the Polish bourgeois elites, still holding the real power in the country. They used Pilsudski 
to induce Moraczewski to resign on 16th January 1919. Reformist illusions in Poland ended 
when the cabinet was taken over by the right-wing Ignacy Jan Paderewski (Polish nationalist 
composer)23. Both the chance of revolution and the moderate social democratic prospect of 
                                               
21 In Poland as a rural country whose population belonged predominantly to the peasant classes, the Catholic 
Church in the countryside had a great influence on the people. Its conservative and anti-Semitic propaganda was 
radically opposed to Bolshevism as a Jewish plot threatening western civilization. For relations between revolution and 
anti-Semitism in the Polish context see: Marzec 2016, Krzywiec 2017.  
22 We should not forget about the revolutionary legend of  Piłsudski as the “savior of  the Polish people, man of  
the moment,” that was deeply rooted within Polish society at that time. He indeed was a savior, but a savior of  the 
Polish ruling class from the revolutionary ferment.  
23 Against his post, Warsaw Workers’ Council organized on 7th February 1919 a general strike that inspired other 
councils, like Lublin’s. As a result, the new government was forced to proclaim partial amnesty for the imprisoned 
workers’ activists (Szczygielski and Tymieniecka 1960, 52-56).  
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reforms disappeared. As a result, PPS had dug their own grave. Everything could change again 
in 1920, when the Red Army reached Bug, but that is another story. 
Conclusion: Methodological anti-communism 
In the right-wing narrative, we see a symptomatic contradiction in reference to the council 
movement in Poland and the revolutionary prospects in general. On the one hand, the council 
phenomenon and the bottom-up activity of the Polish masses in the period are almost 
unrecognizable; on the other, the danger of communist revolution is serious. We can analyze 
it well via Staroń’s example. He argues that “Polish communism creates an exotic and marginal 
group of fanatics, but very flashy and clamorous” (Staroń 2018, 14) or in the same spirit he 
says: 
In 1918 nothing essential could compete with the idea of Polish independence. It was 
rejected only by the marginal group of Polish communists that was irrelevant to the 
aspirations of the majority of Polish society. Other political parties across the whole 
spectrum, including PPS, demanded in the first place rebuilding of the independent 
state. Everyone who was not insane – both politicians and common people - thought 
that socialist ideas were just utopia (Staroń 2018, 161–162).  
This is a typical ideological strategy of diminishing and discrediting opponents through 
presenting their views as something against the normatively constructed concept of nature or 
common sense. Not to mention that on the eve of independence, the influence of the Polish 
Communist Party over the working classes in the main industrial centres was certainly not 
smaller than that of the PPS – it was probably larger (see Deutscher 1958). However, although 
Staroń ignores this fact (and the whole Workers’ Council event), he actually claims that those 
curious and insignificant Polish communists were the real threat to bourgeois Poland. He even 
quotes documents by the Polish secret service from the beginning of 1919, in which we can 
read that revolution then had a great chance of success (Miodowski 2011, 263) – especially 
because of communist mutinies in the Polish army, which aimed at creating a Soviet of Soldiers’ 
Delegates (Staroń 2018, 172). As an example, Staroń – following Miodowski – recalls the 
soldiers from General Haller’s army, who in August 1919 solidarized and cooperated with 
striking miners from Dąbrowa, helping them to disarm gendarmes, but most of all the 
revolutionary uprising in Zamość regiment in December 1918 – revolutionaries seized the town 
and established a Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council (Staroń 2018, 178–183; Miodowski 2011, 
258–262). We see clearly that for the author the only actors who could induce a revolutionary 
situation were soldiers or Soviet agents, not proletarians, and definitely not peasants – because 
the people, masses, rabble, and other marginal underprivileged parts of the society were not 
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recognized in this right-wing narrative as autonomous and conscious subjects who were able 
to act. Therefore, contemporary anti-communist historiography of the October Revolution – 
such as Staroń, Miodowski, or Zieliński – mainly focuses on the Polish soldiers and high-rank 
Bolsheviks, who were the real national traitors, often the outstanding and admirable figures 
fighting on the wrong side of the barricade. For them, history is written only by the great 
personalities, while the masses as such are just meaningless sacks of potatoes, even unworthy 
to be a part of the nation. And this is the ultimate mark of their anti-communism. 
Against this background, we can see how these anti-communists reproduce typical 
conservative and reactionary discourse about the masses, which represses and diminishes the 
poorest strata of society – the rabble, paupers, the mob, etc. (Moll and Pospiszyl 2019). They 
are anxious about the rebellious crowd gathering on the street during the revolutionary events, 
which destabilizes and disorganizes the unjust social order – so the most effective defense 
mechanism for reducing the anxiety is to deny the real existence of the very source of fear, i.e. 
to deny even the existence of the people. For anti-communist historians, Polish society during 
the turbulent year of 1918 was fundamentally divided into two groups: marginal communists 
lunatics (intellectuals, soldiers, and party activists) and the majority of the “healthy” nation (all 
those who identified with national and independence ideology). But what about the workers, 
peasants, or urban paupers and unemployed organizing demonstrations and councils? What 
about those who, for the communists, were the actual subject of social change? The 
nationalistic discourse did not recognize them at all, because they conceive the nation as an 
organic whole, deprived of any internal antagonisms (including class antagonism), and those 
who do not fit into this imagining of the nation are excluded from the community as foreign 
bodies – fanatical Moscow agents as national traitors – or even not counted as a part of social 
landscape, like the rebellious masses. Therefore, anti-communism for Polish rightist historians 
means two things: hatred of the masses who elude nationalistic form, and fear of the possibility 
of radical change that those masses could provoke. In other words, the revolutionary people 
are not a fully human subject for the anti-communists. In this context the classic formulation 
by Jean-Paul Sartre comes to mind: “Every anti-communist is a dog” (Sartre 1961, 248–249).  
To conclude, the independent Polish state was constituted by the alliance of the 
counterrevolutionary forces – from the right to the left – that crushed the possible ‘dual power’ 
scenario in Poland. And all the anti-communist hysteria in AD 2018 – the centenary of 
independence – and the fact that works such as Staroń’s book are still being published, only 
confirms that in 1918 the specter of communism was something more than just a ghost 
haunting Europe from the East.  




Bicz, Henryk. 1934. Rady delegatów robotniczych w Polsce w 1918–1919 r. Wydawnictwo Partyjne: 
Moskwa.  
Bobińska, Helena. 1966. Pamiętniki tamtych lat. T. 1. Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy: 
Warszawa.  
Deutscher, Isaac. 1958. “The Tragedy of the Polish Communist Party”. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/deutscher/1958/Polish-tragedy.htm 
Figes, Orlando. 1996. A People’s Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution. Penguin Books: 
New York. 
Frołow, Sylwia. 2014. Dzierżyński: Miłość i rewolucja. Biografia intymna. Wydawnictwo “Znak”: 
Kraków. 
Furet, Francois. 1999. The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century. 
University of Chicago Press: Chicago.  
Jabłoński, Henryk. 1962. Narodziny Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (1918–1919). Wydawnictwo 
“Wiedza Powszechna”: Warszawa.  
Jabłoński, Henryk. 1967. “Znaczenie Rewolucji Październikowej dla kształtowania się bytu 
narodowo-państwowego i stosunków społecznych w Polsce”. In Rewolucja 
Październikowa a Polska, ed. Tadeusz Cieślak and Leon Grosfeld. Państwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe: Warszawa.  
Kołakowski, Leszek. 1978. Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth and Dissolution, Volume 2: 
The Golden Age. Trans. Paul S. Falla. Oxford University Press: Oxford.  
Kotkin, Stephen. 2015. Stalin: Paradoxes of Power 1878–1928. Penguin Books: New York. 
Krzywiec, Grzegorz. 2017. Polska bez Żydów: Studia z dziejów idei, wyobrażeń i praktyk 
antysemickich na ziemiach polskich początku XX wieku (1905–1914). Wydawnictwo Instytutu 
Historii PAN: Warszawa.  
Lenin, Vladimir I. 1913. “Theses on the National Question”. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/jun/30.htm.  
Losurdo, Domenico.2015. War and Revolution: Rethinking the 20th Century. Verso: London–New 
York. 
Maila, Martin. 1994. The Soviet Tragedy. A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991. The Free 
Press: New York.  
Malinowski, Henryk. 1967. “Walki polskiej lewicy robotniczej 1918–1919”. In Rewolucja 
Październikowa a Polska, ed. Tadeusz Cieślak and Leon Grosfeld. Państwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe: Warszawa.  
Marzec, Wiktor. 2016. Rebelia i reakcja: Rewolucja 1905 roku i plebejskie doświadczenie polityczne. 
Wydawnictwo UŁ/Universitas”: Łódź–Kraków.  
Bartosz Wójcik: The October Revolution in Poland...
 
69 
Matejko, Adam. 1963. “Rady robotnicze”. In Adam Matejko. Praca i koleżeństwo: Zagadnienia 
socjologii pracy. Wiedza Powszechna: Warszawa.  
McMeekin, Sean. 2009. History’s Greatest Heist: The Looting of Russia by the Bolsheviks. Yale 
University Press: New Haven. 
Miodowski, Adam. 2011. Polityka wojskowa radykalnej lewicy polskiej. 1917–1921. Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku: Białystok.  
Miodowski, Adam. 2017. Polish revolutionary formations in the Red Army structures (1918–1921). 
Wydawnictwo PRYMAT: Białystok.  
Moll, Łukasz and Michał Pospiszyl. 2019. “Filozofia polityczna motłochu”. Le Monde 
Diplomatique – edycja polska 1(155).  
Najdus, Walentyna. 1967. Polacy w rewolucji 1917 roku. Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe: 
Warszawa.. 
Najdus, Walentyna. 1971. Lewica polska w Kraju Rad: 1918–1920. Państwowe Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe: Warszawa.  
Niedziałkowski, Mieczysław. 1930. Demokracja parlamentarna w Polsce. Księgarnia robotnicza: 
Warszawa.  
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1961. Situations, IV. Gallimard: Paris.  
Staroń, Mateusz. 2018. Zdrajcy: Polacy u boku Lenina. Bellona: Warszawa.  
Sunny, Ronald G. 2017. Red Flag Unfurled: History, Historians and the Russian Revolution. Verso: 
London–New York. 
Szczygielski, Zbigniew and Aleksandra Tymieniecka. 1960. Z dziejów Rad Delegatów Robotniczych 
w Polsce. Książka i Wiedza: Warszawa.  
Toporowicz, Wiesława. 1988. Rewolucja Październikowa: Polska–Polacy. Wydawnictwo 
“Współpraca”: Warszawa. 
Walicki, Andrzej. 1995. Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the 
Communist Utopia. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA.  
Wrzosek, Mieczysław. 1969. Polskie korpusy wojskowe w Rosji w latach 1917–1918. Książka i 
Wiedza: Warszawa.  
Zaremba, Zygmunt. 1983. Wspomnienia: Pokolenie przełomu. Wydawnictwo Literackie: Kraków.  
Zieliński, Konrad. 2013. O Polską Republikę Rad: Działalność polskich komunistów w Rosji 
Radzieckiej 1918–1922. Wydawnictwo UMCS: Lublin.  
Žižek, Slavoj. 2002. Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in (Mis)use of a Notion. 
Verso: London–New York.  
Žižek, Slavoj. 2004. Revolution at the Gates: A Selection of Writings from February to October 1917: 
V.I. Lenin. Verso: London–New York 
 
Praktyka Teoretyczna 1(31)/2019 – Anti-communisms: Discourses of Exclusion 
 
70 
Bartosz Wójcik – philosopher, dialectical materialist, research assistant at the Institute of 




Instytut Nauk Politycznych PAN 





CITATION:  Wójcik, Bartosz. 2019. “The October Revolution in Poland: A History of Anti-
Communist Repression” Praktyka Teoretyczna 1(31): 50–71.  
DOI: 10.14746/prt.2019.1.3 
 
FUNDING: This work received support from the Polish National Science Centre under grant 
„Filozofia negatywności Hegla i Žižka” (number 2016/21/N/HS1/03514). 
 
AUTOR: Bartosz Wójcik 
TYTUŁ: Rewolucja październikowa w Polsce: Historia antykomunistycznego wyparcia 
ABSTRAKT: Podstawowa teza niniejszego artykułu jest następująca: rewolucja październikowa 
miała istotny wpływ zarówno na odzyskanie przez Polskę niepodległości, jak i na kształt 
polskich walk klasowych. Jednak historia tego wpływu jest całkowicie wypierana albo nawet 
jawnie negowana we współczesnym hegemonicznym prawicowym dyskursie historycznym 
w Polsce. Setna rocznica rewolucji wywołała publicystyczną dyskusję, w ramach której 
wydarzenia te były przedstawiane jako „demoniczne źródło dwudziestowiecznego 
totalitaryzmu”, zapoznając tym samym entuzjazm, jaki rewolucja wywołała wśród Polaków 
(zarówno jej uczestników, jak i pełnych nadziei obserwatorów). Nacjonalistyczna 
historiografia, idealizująca Polaków za wszelką cenę, stara się usilnie wymazać polskie 
zaangażowanie w „Czerwony Październik” albo zredukować je do rangi nieistotnego epizodu. 
W związku z tym tekst stanowi analizę dominującej narracji na temat rewolucji bolszewickiej w 
Polsce na przykładzie popularnonaukowej publikacji Mateusza Staronia Zdrajcy: Polacy u boku 
Lenina. Stawką tej analizy jest z jednej strony zbadanie strategii i sposobów 
antykomunistycznego „przepisywania” historii, podporządkowanej doraźnym celom 
ideologicznym, z drugiej zaś przedstawienie alternatywnej – wobec obowiązujących 
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antykomunistycznych klisz – narracji dotyczącej rewolucji październikowej w polskim 
kontekście, opierającej się na trzech zagadnieniach: 
1. Polskiego uczestnictwa w październikowych wydarzeniach; 
2. Wpływu rewolucji na odzyskanie niepodległości przez Polskę; 
3. Polskich rad robotniczych jako bezpośredniej odpowiedzi na rewolucję rosyjską.  
Cel niniejszego artykułu nie ogranicza się – w związku z powyższym – do przedstawienia 
alternatywy dla dominującego dyskursu, wykonania kolejnego ćwiczenia w zakresie politycznej 
i historycznej wyobraźni czy wyciągnięcia na światło dzienne wypartych aspektów polskiej 
historii. Idzie tu raczej o ukazanie logiki i struktury samej antykomunistycznej narracji. 
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